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Around 750 a.d., new settlements in Chaco Canyon in the Southwest United States began 
moving toward intensified urban form, monumental architecture, and increased hierarchi-
cal social organization that bordered on nation-state authority. But around 1140 a.d., the 
relatively concentrated populations in Chaco Canyon dispersed over just a few generations. 
At new destinations emigrants from the canyon did not reinstate the urban intensities and 
political hierarchies that had dominated there. Four lessons from this history can be drawn. 
First, the model of social and political coordination that best fits the history of Chaco Can-
yon is one of escalating and deescalating gift-giving. Models that instead appeal to purely 
transactional relations, such as contracts, are historically and philosophically inadequate. 
Second, and more broadly, the real power of any well-functioning, complex, and urban-
ized society must be a reserve of generalized social trust. This was true then, and remains 
true today. Third, while environmental pressures play important roles in the formation of 
foundational urban settlements such as those in Chaco Canyon, we should be careful not to 
explain too much by them. As then, our own environmental challenges call upon us to nurture 
political arrangements, especially in our cities, that can address environmental constraints 
and challenges. Except perhaps when circumstances become impossibly dire, we should 
treat environmental constraints as the boundaries into which we must fit ourselves through 
political means. Finally, philosophers should investigate developments in historical urban 
settlements. Such cases are indispensable for understanding human cooperation, forms of 
social authority, and environmental decision making.
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I. TRANSACTIONS AND GIFTS
 Beginning around 750 a.d., thousands of people began living in relatively dense 
urban settlements in and around Chaco Canyon in what is now northwest New 
Mexico. The evolving modes of social authority seemed to be moving toward 
something like what we see in contemporary nation-states.1 This push was embodied 
in cultural unity, extensive road construction, and daunting monumental building. 
But around 1140 a.d., the people migrated away from the canyon.
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 Exactly what happened there and why has been the subject of many debates. So 
far most of these debates have been taken up within archeology and anthropology. 
Part of the significance of this history is that the human experiment there seems 
to lie at the crucial junction between pre-state societies and modern nation-state 
societies. Contemporary labels for the social integration reached at Chaco Canyon 
include pre-state societies, middle-range societies, or intermediate-level societies.2
It is especially important that Chaco Canyon sites are examples of foundational 
urban settlements. Foundational settlements are settlements that are not merely the 
extensions of already established urban centers.3 For example, outposts, trading 
seaports, and colonies are not original settlements. These are more like extended 
organs of societies and cities, rather than whole and self-sufficient organisms in 
their own right. Foundational settlements are especially important to understanding 
the nature and evolution of unified forms of authority in human societies. Descrip-
tively, we can see in foundational settlements how ecological, technological, and 
social elements can be drawn together in ways that make condensed urban forms 
and increased social cohesion necessary. The intensification of human civilization 
into urban centers is not a mere choice among other options. It is a solution to 
several environmental and social challenges. Philosophically, foundational urban 
settlements offer us lenses through which we can see social possibilities and their 
pre-conditions. We can see, sometimes in contrast to what came before foundational 
settlements, and what came after them, the outlines of the promises and limits of 
urban organization. We can see what goods they enable and what goods they may 
foreclose.
 My discussion proceeds as follows. Section two briefly outlines the history of 
Chaco Canyon spanning its coalesce and dispersal, focusing especially on its pre-state 
years. In section three, I argue that there are good reasons to hazard philosophical 
histories in a Hegelian vein of the social and political organization that was reached 
there and why it then dispersed. Such histories are aimed at understanding deep 
motives driving foundational settlements and their dissolution. In sections four and 
five, I discuss two broad models of social organization. Transactional models include 
at least contracts, bargaining, and debt. These models share two ideas. First, they 
hold that even widespread and collective cooperation can be understood primar-
ily in terms of the interests of individuals or small groups. Second, transactional 
models hold that such cooperation can be modeled in terms of their transparent 
and discrete transactions with other individuals or small groups. Such models, I 
argue, fail to account for the ways that Chaco culture took shape and the ways it 
dispersed. Instead, I propose a model that features gift-giving as the central social 
 2 See Susan Keech McIntosh for a discussion of such terms in “Pathways to Complexity: An African 
Perspective,” in Beyond Chiefdoms: Pathways to Complexity in Africa, ed. Susan Keech McIntosh 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1–2.
 3 Ben A. Nelson, “Mesoamerican Objects and Symbols in Chaco Canyon Contexts,” in The Archeol-
ogy of Chaco Canyon: An Eleventh-Century Pueblo Regional Center, ed. Stephen H. Lekson (Sante 
Fe: School of American Research Press, 2006), pp. 366–67.
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interaction that enabled foundational settlements to arise. On this model, in contrast 
to transactional models, coalescing social and political organization traffics primar-
ily in shared cultural interests and in social ambiguity. It does not establish social 
power vested in a determinate authority. Rather, it builds a general and widespread 
trust. Section six is a reflection on how issues of trust in contemporary urban set-
tings continue to be related to environmental decision-making.
II. COALESCENCE, FLORESCENCE, AND DISPERSAL
 Chaco Canyon lies just to the west of the continental divide of North America at 
an elevation of 6,200 feet. There is general agreement among experts that ancestral 
Pueblo settlements began there around 800 a.d. for reasons of ecological prudence. 
The canyon and area around it provided relatively more reliable water, a slightly 
extended growing season, and the relatively close provision of materials such as 
trees and wild food such as rabbits and deer. While preferable to other nearby areas, 
in absolute terms, the environmental challenges to permanent human settlement in 
the canyon and the plateaus around it remained formidable.4 For those that settled 
there, some degree of shared cooperation was established through the need for 
collective subsistence.
 But altogether it does not appear that ecological need necessitated the particular 
form of hierarchical political authority that seems to have begun in earnest around 
900 a.d. To be sure, some version of social cooperation was required, but Chaco 
culture developed far beyond what was needed for subsistence. From around 1040 to 
1135 a.d., about a dozen family residences were expanded in size and extravagance 
from previously existing family dwelling into what are called Great Houses—the 
four most prominent being Pueblo Bonito in the canyon, Chetro Ketl next to it, 
Pueblo del Arroyo down the river a little, and Pueblo Alto on a mesa above. This 
period is sometimes referred to as Chaco Canyon’s florescence.5 These Great 
Houses were focal points of what has become known generally as Chaco culture, 
which seems to have encompassed beyond the canyon itself to include much of 
the San Juan river basin. In all, Chaco culture seems to have dominated roughly 
what is now the northwest quarter of present day New Mexico and into the modern 
four corners region until about 1140 a.d.
 To build these monumental structures hundreds of thousands of pieces of tim-
ber were carried by hand, sometimes at distances of fifty miles. Housing clusters 
became unified and architecturally integrated into monumental residences. Multi-
story buildings such as Pueblo Bonito were placed at stunning locations, framed 
 4 R. Gwinn Vivian, Carla R. Van West, Jeffrey S. Dean, Nancy J. Akins, Mollie S. Toll, and Thomas 
C. Windes, “Ecology and Economy,” in The Archeology of Chaco Canyon: An Eleventh-Century Pueblo 
Regional Center, ed. Stephen H. Lekson (Sante Fe: School of American Research Press, 2006), pp. 45–65.
 5 William Lipe, “Notes from the North,” in The Archeology of Chaco Canyon: An Eleventh-Century 
Pueblo Regional Center, ed. Stephen H. Lekson (Sante Fe: School of American Research Press, 2006), 
pp. 261, 280–95.
WALKING AWAY FROM CHACO CANYON
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS156 Vol. 40
against dramatic cliffs and geological features such as Threatening Rock, which 
is an immense outcropping of the canyon wall. Extensive foundations were laid 
for Pueblo Bonito that reached well beyond its monumental walls.6 Collections of 
smaller satellite farmhouses proliferated in and around the canyon. Networks of 
dams and irrigation ditches were extended and reinforced. New roads were overbuilt 
to be wider, flatter, and straighter than what was required for travel or trade alone. 
Specialized, artisanal trade goods such as pottery, jewelry, lithic tools, and exotic 
birds were imported, some from hundreds of miles away, and disproportionately 
concentrated in the great houses.
 Most archeologists agree that Chaco culture reached an important level of social 
stratification, and the standard view is that at the height of its complexity Chaco 
Canyon hosted distinct social classes. Evidence for such social distinctions comes 
from, for example, differences in burial placements and the artifacts associated 
with them. Those of higher status in Chaco were buried in the oldest, and therefore 
presumably the most prestigious, parts of the Great Houses. Such burials certainly 
contained the greatest wealth and most significant cultural symbols. Then there 
are the monumental Great Houses themselves. The Chacoan Great Houses were 
architecturally distinct in their size and formalization. Evidence suggests that only 
a few families seem to have occupied these structures all year long. Other family 
groups seem to have mostly lived nearby in far smaller shelters, and came and went 
to the Great Houses, though perhaps thousands at a time, for shared ceremonial 
events.7 As Lekson, Windes, and McKenna put it, 
 6 John R. Stein, Dabney Ford, and Richard Friedman, “Reconstructing Pueblo Bonito,” in Pueblo 
Bonito: Center of the Chacoan World, ed. Jill E. Neitzel (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2003), 
33–60.
 7 Lipe, “Notes from the North,” pp. 286–95.
 8 Steven H. Leckson, Thomas Windes, and Peter J. McKenna, “Architecture,” in The Archeology 
of Chaco Canyon: An Eleventh-Century Pueblo Regional Center, ed. Stephen H. Lekson (Sante Fe: 
School of American Research Press, 2006), p. 112.
 9 James Judge and Linda Cordell, “Society and Polity” in Lekson, The Archeology of Chaco Canyon: 
An Eleventh-Century Pueblo Regional Center, pp. 189–210.
 10 Lynne Sebastian, “The Chaco Synthesis,” in Lekson, The Archeology of Chaco Canyon: An 
Eleventh-Century Pueblo Regional Center,  p. 407.
If we are correct that Great Houses were elite residences, then Chaco was also socially 
and politically hierarchical, within itself and within its region. Different groups at Chaco 
labored at different tasks: ruling, priesting, building, crafting, and so forth. While almost 
all may have farmed, there was also (we think) a division of labor or, at least, of tasks.8
 Scholars of Chaco agree that settlements associated with Chaco culture centered 
in the canyon achieved a high level of coordination with respect to cultural unity 
and political authority.9 But archeologists and anthropologists examining Chaco 
sites are still in some dispute about the nature of this coordination. They roughly 
divide on this issue between treating Chaco culture and its monuments as either 
grounded in ritual ceremony and symbolism or instead grounded in political power.10 
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This debate is illustrated by their contrasting accounts of Chaco Canyon, which 
explain social goods such as food and construction. On the one hand, the enormous 
energy required for projects such as the Great Houses suggest that perhaps there was 
political power and coercion at work, perhaps backed by some emerging authority 
of force. The amount of human labor required for the completion and maintenance 
of the grand houses and overbuilt roads is simply astonishing, especially given the 
regional distribution of resources such as trees, compounded by the lack of beasts 
of burden such as horses.11 It may be difficult to accept that such toil could have 
been done without some sort of tangible threat behind it.
 A first natural thought is that the Great Houses stored food, and that gaining access 
to such insurance in hard times required first the labor to produce these buildings. 
But this simple hypothesis is undermined by the fact that even the largest Great 
Houses did not seem to have permanently stored exceptionally large amounts of 
essential goods. Moreover, Wilcott Toll argues that typical patterns of food sharing 
were diffuse, likely ranging across linguistic groups, and that “Most organization 
took place at the household level, the primary unit of production for most tasks.”12
 Another thought is that the organization of Chaco culture may have been built 
on centralized violence and threats of violence. There was a system of line-of-sight 
communication towers between Chaco and other nearby settlements. While it is 
possible that some degree of coercive control may have been passed this way, it was 
likely limited. Mechanisms for dispatching violence systematically are undermined 
by large geographical distances.13 Furthermore, though violence did occur, it was 
not especially pronounced at the times when it would have been most politically 
useful. Violence was no more likely at times of increased food production and 
construction, or later when people were dispersing at the highest rates.14 Moreover, 
what violence there was is entirely compatible with small-scale group violence, 
which occurred before and after Chaco’s cultural dominance. Violence does not 
seem to have been integral to the intensification of social organization. Violence 
did not put people to work, and it did not keep them in place.
 Overall, the most plausible outline is that elites played primarily social advi-
sory roles, most likely coordinating religious knowledge and ceremony, perhaps 
in conjunction with prudential concerns such as planting and harvests.15 As an 
embodiment of their role, such families were housed in structures that projected 
their social and cultural status, especially in relation to the cosmos.16
 At least in the popular mind of some, it is not Chaco Canyon’s coalescence that is 
 11 Mary P. Metcalf, “Construction Labor at Pueblo Bonito,” in Pueblo Bonito: Center of the Chacoan 
World, ed. Jill E. Neitzel (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2003), 72–79.
 12 H. Wilcott Toll, “Organization and Production” in The Archeology of Chaco Canyon: An Eleventh-
Century Pueblo Regional Center, ed. Stephen H. Lekson (Sante Fe: School of American Research Press, 
2006), pp. 117–51.
 13 Lipe, “Notes from the North,” p. 287.
 14 Ibid., pp. 291–94.
 15 Ibid., p. 295.
 16 Stein, Ford, and Friedman, “Reconstructing Pueblo Bonito,” pp. 58–59.
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the most striking aspect of its history. Rather, many focus instead on what is some-
times characterized as its collapse, which is typically dated to about 1140 a.d. This 
terminal event seems to be the last of several natural fluctuations in population that 
occurred for a few hundred years prior, and was concluded within a few decades. 
Sometimes this final dramatic drop in population is accompanied with lurid tales 
of cannibalism, sometimes as part of modern cautionary tales against ecocide.17 
But while everyone agrees the dispersion from Chaco Canyon was rapid—within 
a generation or so—it appears it was not especially turbulent or violent all things 
considered. There is some evidence suggesting violence, but there were no wars. 
The dispersion was dramatic and terminal for at least several hundred years, but it 
was not apocalyptic.18
 Nevertheless, the dispersion from Chaco Canyon is clear and notable for at least 
two reasons. First, its centralized and hierarchical social structures, epitomized 
by a few high status burials and the elite residences of the Great Houses, were 
lost. Second, also lost was Chaco Canyon’s regional dominance as a culture. Its 
importance had been declared by the fact that most monumental roads converged 
on the Great Houses in “downtown” Chaco. Especially striking is the fact that 
descendants of Chaco, who appear to have mostly migrated to the south and to the 
north to places such as Mesa Verde in present day Colorado, did not recreate the 
hierarchical features of Chaco culture at their new homes. This fact also under-
mines any account on which ecological necessity or disaster alone required the 
pre-state forms of cooperation and authority that Chaco culture took. The places 
that emigrants from Chaco Canyon landed were not so different that it would have 
been impossible to reproduce much of Chaco culture if they had choosen to do so. 
But they did not. Environments do place boundaries upon the cultures people can 
adopt, but environments do not uniquely determine them.
 In all, the most reasonable interpretation is to believe that people came to reject 
the forms of cooperation and authority political elites were developing and testing 
there—so much so that even decedents continued to reject them for centuries after-
wards.19 It does not appear that those who moved away from Chaco Canyon were 
forced to do so merely out of ecological desperation, though fluctuating drought 
conditions certainly put strains on possibilities for cooperation. Rather, they judged 
the overall situation socially undesirable and pursued other possibilities available 
to them.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY
 Hegel outlines three approaches to history.20 First, the original history of a time 
 17 See a response to this sort of explanation in Michael Wilcox, “Marketing Conquest and the Vanish-
ing Indians,” in Questioning Collapse: Human Resilience, Ecological Vulnerability, and the Aftermath 
of Empire, ed. Patricia A. McAnany and Norman Yoffee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), pp. 113–41.
 18 Lipe, “Notes from the North,” p. 310.
 19 Judge and Cordell, “Society and Polity,” pp. 189–210.
 20 G. W. F. Hegel, “Introduction,” in The Philosophy of History (New York: Dover, 1956), pp. 1–115.
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and place is the history generated at the time in writing, monuments, and speech. 
Second, the reflective history of a time and place is composed after that time has 
passed, and interprets the past in light of new agendas. Finally, for Hegel, philo-
sophical history interprets history as manifesting the underlying rational processes 
of the world and humanity. Notice that his taxonomy ranges from what can be the 
most objectively certain—namely, original history—to what may seem to reach 
too far—the interpretive postulates of philosophical history. But also notice that 
this movement goes from the least philosophically significant to the potentially 
most profound.
 Many archeologists have cautioned against overly ambitious interpretations of 
life in places like Chaco Canyon. Archeologists have long warned against trying 
to read too much about culture and social organization—especially claims about 
ideas, behavior, and motives—out of material artifacts such as pottery, roads, and 
buildings.21 Many tend to be the most comfortable with original history, less com-
fortable with reflective history, and even less comfortable with philosophical history. 
They rightly point out that the uncontroversial material relevant to understanding 
Chaco is largely original, for instance in the archeological evidence. But forms 
of evidence such as potshards, seed sedimentation in riverbeds, the placement of 
buildings, and so on, all underdetermine the deeper meanings of important social 
events, for example, possible changes in social organization, such as the rise of 
hierarchies. Even the most plausible explanations can only ever be explanations 
of best fit with current empirical evidence. Reflective histories, such as those that 
can be found in oral traditions, may not be as neutral as one would hope if we are 
trying to reconstruct events and choices of the past.22 In any case, neither archeo-
logical evidence nor oral histories can alone establish with certainty how people 
there conceived of their world or why people made the choices that they did.
 Additionally, we should heed David Harvey’s reminder that even forms of life 
that broadly fall under some shared category still often exhibit wide variations 
within. For example, we should not presume that the real substance of Athenian 
democracy bears any important similarity to the real substance of democracy in 
modern Sao Paulo.23  Forms of cooperation cannot be fully separated from their 
instantiations. Cooperation is constituted by how it comes to be, how many people 
it involves, who it benefits, how it replicates itself, exactly which combinations 
of opportunities and responsibilities it sets in place, and so on. The precise nature 
 21 Though for some insight on the nuances, see Robert D. Drennan and Christian E. Peterson, “Chal-
lenges for Comparative Study of Early Complex Societies,” in The Comparative Archeology of Complex 
Societies, ed. Michael E. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 62–87.
 22 See Leigh J. Kuwanwisiwma “Yupkoyvi: The Hopi Story of Chaco Canyon,” in In Search of Chaco: 
New Approaches to an Archeological Enigma, ed. David Grant Nobel (Santa Fe: School for Advanced 
Research Press, 2004), pp. 41–47. Also see Richard Begay, “Tse Biyah Anii’ahi: Chaco Canyon and 
Its Place in Navajo History,” in In Search of Chaco: New Approaches to an Archeological Enigma, ed. 
David Grant Nobel (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2004), pp. 55–60.
 23 David Harvey, “Contested Cities: Social Processes and Spatial Form,” in The City Reader, ed. 
Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout (London: Routledge), p. 232.
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and scope of any form of cooperation is changed by irrigation, by trade networks, 
by the telegraph, and by the nuclear bomb.24
 Archeologists, cultural anthropologists, and political scientists working in histori-
cal cases sometimes address the issues above by describing stage-wise taxonomies 
of social and technological evolution. Human societies are put on various charts 
that can range from hunter-gathering to the mega-cities of India and China. This 
way of representing cultures has been debated for particular cases, including Chaco 
Canyon.25 Importantly, a trend among archeologists is to acknowledge that pat-
terns of development are likely more varied that previously assumed. The lines 
from hunter-gatherers to mega-cities are not always straight, and there are many 
different kinds of paths that move back and forth toward one or the other. Such 
variations are yet another reason to be cautious about too rigid interpretations of 
social evolution.
 What can be reasonably said, then, about the deep histories of social cooperation 
at the pre-state threshold? Must all interpretation fly beyond the objective evidence?
We should attempt to build up a philosophical history of Chaco Canyon that does 
more than chronicle a series of separate and accidental details. We should try to 
discover the social origins of the urban forms there, and ideally these origins would 
count the relationships there as something beyond mere collections of people who 
happen to have found themselves together.26 We should seek some middle ground 
between overly rigid stage-wise taxonomies and too much muddling about in every 
detail. Whether, as Hegel may have thought, all history can be shown to be a work-
ing out of some rational principle, it is independently plausible that humans are 
acting on reasons when they put themselves together into urban forms. We should 
care about modeling those reasons as best we can.
 We should care especially about cases like Chaco Canyon even though it presents 
its own evidential challenges. One comparative challenge is that other histories 
more obviously reveal themselves with greater archeological and cultural clarity. We 
know a lot about the urban developments of the Greeks, the Romans, the Mayans, 
the Chinese, and the Persians—all of which left relatively straightforward evidence 
detailing what they believed they were up to in discursive representations, such as 
writing. But there are at least three reasons to dwell on the social experiences of 
pre-state societies such as Chaco Canyon, and hazard interpretations of them.
 24 Marshal McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994); 
Sam Bass Warner, “Evolution and Transformation: The American Industrial Metropolis, 1840–1940,” 
in The City Reader, 5th ed., ed. Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 
55–64.
 25 For a comprehensive view of the Chaco Synthesis project involving many experts on Chaco 
culture, see Stephen H. Lekson, ed., The Archeology of Chaco Canyon: An Eleventh-Century Pueblo 
Regional Center (Sante Fe: School of American Research Press, 2006).
 26 Augustine appeals to a distinction between genuine cities and mere collections of people. See 
Augustine, City of God against the Pagans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), bk. 2.
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 One reason to entertain deeper interpretations is that we should not suppose that 
people writing in and about their own times can or do succeed in peering through 
the ambiguities of their own situation. Various impulses toward coordination are 
not always more clear to their wielders or to their subjects than to outsiders. A 
closer proximity in space and time does not necessarily mean clearer insight. This 
is also a reason to not merely defer to oral histories. It is possible to be so close to 
an event or social arrangement to not be able to fully grasp it. 
 Second, seemingly anomalous sites may reveal things not found in more expected 
sites. If our descriptive and normative models of urban authority are too neat, it may 
be because we have pre-emptively—though perhaps unknowingly—already excised 
those experiences that fall outside of the patterns more commonly discussed.27 I 
submit that one especially important kind of human settlement experience that 
is difficult to fit into standard, Western accounts of cooperation is that of a rapid 
coalescence and dispersion in foundational pre-state societies. In this essay, I focus 
on Chaco Canyon, but several other societies have seemingly avoided—perhaps 
intentionally—intensified social and political authority. Some have argued that 
this deliberate choice can be seen in some societies in southeast Asia,28 potlatch 
traditions of the U.S. northwest,29 and some settlement patterns in sub-Saharan 
Africa.30 More philosophical study of such places and what they have to teach us 
about social cooperation and authority is certainly needed.
 Third, such near-state episodes can too easily be treated as instances of aborted 
human political evolution—as if modern nation-state societies are the natural and 
best outcome of human living in minimally hospitable circumstances. On this loaded 
expectation, societies that do not bend toward nation-state arrangements have failed. 
While the modern terminology of “pre-state” societies tries to imply an evaluative 
neutrality about the historical worth of various societies, overall popular discourse 
nevertheless seems to suggest that pre-state societies that never came into full 
statehood, or perhaps have fallen from it, must be internally deficient or unlucky. 
As a corollary, such societies are treated as useful only insofar as they promise to 
reveal to us how we might avoid sharing their fate. For example, the title of Jared 
Diamond’s popular book, which features the history of Chaco prominently, is titled 
Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.31 It is mostly left unexplored 
that such societies purposefully chose, all things considered, to avoid or abandon 
greater cultural intensification.
 27 McIntosh, “Pathways to complexity: An African perspective,” pp. 1–2.
 28 James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
 29 Aldona Jonaitis, Chiefly Feasts: The Enduring Kwakiutl Potlatch (New York: University of 
Washington Press, 1991).
 30 McIntosh, “Pathways to Complexity: An African Perspective,” pp. 1–30.
 31 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (London: Penguin,  2006).
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IV. CONTRACTS
 Now it can be asked: what is the most plausible philosophical history of Chaco 
Canyon that comports with the evidence?
 In addition to the evidence already given, there are general reasons to doubt that 
Chaco Culture, as a foundational settlement, was first and foremost organized by 
means of systematic violence or threats of violence. Consolidation of social coop-
eration does not necessarily require the centralization of violence that we often see 
in more socially complex societies. Anthropologists and archeologists have rightly 
emphasized that powers of centralized violence are late arrivals to foundational 
social organizations. Authoritative force cannot be the primordial source of stable 
foundational societies because it is something that itself first requires an existing 
stable order. To be sure, the authority of force can bootstrap itself up once it is suf-
ficiently established. As Niccolo Machiavelli pointed out, along with many others, 
leaders can use organized violence to control or instigate further violence.32 But 
force cannot cobble the shoes for its own bootstraps.
 It is easy to forget that one common feature of current nation-states is that they 
attempt to unite forms of social power and authority that are originally very differ-
ent in nature and scope. This can conceal the nature of their coalescence and how 
they might come back apart. It is important to build up a picture of the transitions 
into and away from state-like organizations that does not assume that the forms 
of power and authority we find in them now must also explain their very origin. It 
is important to have a picture that does not assume that where people end up was 
intended by them all along.
 Sometimes it is thought that extended, stable societies have formed in order to 
create surpluses over and above what was required for subsistence, and a deeper aim 
of this was to create a means of power over others. But even the indirect coercion 
of withholding food and support also seems to only come after some high degree 
of cooperation is already established. Across a wide range of cases, it appears more 
likely that foundational urban settlements were generated to cope with shortages. 
Social cooperation helped to distribute more reliably ecological and biological 
scarcities than would be possible without cooperation.33 
 For these reasons, I focus on models that account for cooperation—in at least 
pre-state, foundational societies—predominantly in terms of some version of 
voluntary choice. In this section I focus on the transactional model of contracts. 
In the next I focus on systems of gift-giving. The transactional models discussed 
here share in common two main ideas. First, widespread and collective cooperation 
can be understood primarily in terms of the interests of individuals, or perhaps 
their own small groups. Second, such cooperation can be modeled in terms of 
 32 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. James B. Atkinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1976).
 33 Tainter, “The Nature of Complex Societies,” pp. 31–38.
Summer 2018 163
their transparent and discrete transactions with other individuals or small groups. 
Instances of cooperation are transparent insofar as the terms are set in advance and 
known to all parties. Instances of cooperation are discrete insofar as they can be 
wholly completed without any residual obligation.
 Contract models take promising to be the central mechanism of cooperation 
into pre-state societies, and take successful use of this mechanism to be the basis 
of social and political organization. Broadly speaking, contract models hold that 
societies are held together by promises that individuals make and keep, where the 
terms of these contracts are fairly clear and explicit in what they expect to gain in 
return, such as loyalty and labor in exchange for protections of life and property. 
There are at least four problems with contract models as far as Chaco culture is 
concerned.
 First, admittedly, such foundational settlements would have to find innovative 
ways to concede to their ecological circumstance—the provisioning of water, food, 
shelter. But thinking carefully through cases like Chaco pose serious problems for 
all accounts of political organization grounded in purely transactional contracts. 
When people began to settle in Chaco Canyon and surrounding areas, conditions 
would have been harsh enough to require some minimal level of cooperation, for 
instance, the courtesy of not raiding one another. But conditions were not so harsh 
as to require a comprehensive political organization of the sort that would prompt 
monumental constructions for cultural elites that went well beyond the personal 
interests of others.
 One response available to contract theorists is to present a notion of contract as 
something held more broadly. Instead of supposing that contracts between individu-
als explain successful organization, figures such as Hobbes may present the notion 
of promising contracts as something directed at some shared, collective authority. 
For Hobbes, instituting an overwhelming political force was a pre-condition for 
the binding nature of contracts. If one can escape promises, he supposed, then 
there can be no reliable system of promise-making that will reliably allow social 
cooperation. Thus, establishing social cooperation, for Hobbes, meant allegiance 
to a larger political authority, and not primarily to other individuals themselves.34 
Such a move runs into the second problem with contract models, and one that will 
be a reoccurring issue for other transactional models. The problem is that the origi-
nal explanation, a simple one involving promises, in order to fit the phenomenon, 
must be so stretched that it has become a different explanation. People can speak 
of a social contract, and they even sometimes do, but this notion is unrecognizable 
as the notion of contract with which we began. The notion we began with is the 
idea that contracts are discrete promises between individuals or small groups. The 
new proposal is amended by now requiring promises to collective authorities. The 
  34 Here the seminal illustration of working through these sorts of issues is probably his discussion 
of the “Laws of Nature” in chap. 14. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1994).
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expectation of explicit terms is also amended such that one can agree to the general 
terms of abiding by that collective authority. Both of these changes are significant 
modifications of the original model. The modified proposal is no longer so simple 
in its transactional nature.
 Third, as social intensification increased it would have been impossible for people 
to consciously and explicitly agree to a rising political organization at the time it 
was occurring. This impossibility rests on the fact that cultural and political forms 
achieved in Chaco were genuinely new and novel. They were geographically unique 
and socially original. It would have been impossible for anyone then to know what 
political organization in the particular world of Chaco would really amount to in 
the future, and impossible to know how needless or oppressive it would have to 
become before it would be reasonable to abandon it.
 Fourth, notice that the notion of a contract or promise is not especially explana-
tory as far as social cooperation goes. Promising is a mechanism for agreement, 
but not an explanation for why people would seek agreement. Insofar as we are 
making conjectures about the philosophical history of Chaco culture, pointing to 
contracts as an explanation for agreement is not that far from explaining agreement 
by claiming that agreement occurred.
V. GIFT-GIVING, BARGAINING, AND DEBT
 I have so far argued that what we know about Chaco Canyon does not comport 
well with philosophical models of its history that feature as their fundamental ex-
planation coordinated violence, extortion through withholding necessary goods, or 
simple notions of contracts. In this section, I argue that we should look to models 
that take systematic gift-giving as the central mechanism of social cooperation.
 It should be emphasized that gift-giving is serious social business, not less serious 
than explicit promising or written contracts, and not less serious than the exercise of 
governmental force. I have absolutely no intention of romanticizing gift-giving as 
a basis for utopian visions. What I do propose is that the concepts and social logic 
of gift-giving offer important resources for understanding the overall cooperative 
shape of foundational societies such as Chaco Canyon. I suggest below that gift-
giving remains an important foundation even in contemporary cities.
 The central thread of the argument is as follows: a gift-giving model fits well 
with, and explains, the levels of social organization and social authority that seemed 
to have been reached in and around Chaco Canyon. It furthermore does a good 
job of explaining why the coalescence and dispersion took the form that it did. I 
make my case now by laying out several of the central features of the social logic 
of gift-giving, and how they fit with and explain the Chaco case. Along the way, I 
address two final transactional explanations: bargaining and systems of debt.
 One important aspect of any system of cooperation in larger, complex societies is 
that it must somehow address incommensurability and diversity of participation. In 
such circumstances, there need to be means for cooperation even when equivalent 
or similar goods or services cannot be exchanged, even over long scales of time. For 
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example, a system of gift-giving can work even when food now cannot be traded 
for food later. Gift-giving is appropriate in situations in which people are somehow 
expected to contribute to general projects, but where they can only do so in very 
different ways, for example, to monumental buildings that are publicly shared as 
cultural goods. Gift-giving is also especially appropriate in circumstances of social 
inequality. As Aristotle notes, people cannot coherently treat their relationship to 
their parents as an obvious debt that must be repaid in kind since children cannot 
possibly return the benefit of bringing their parents into existence. Instead a child’s 
proper response is to ungrudgingly offer meaningful gifts of honor and respect.35 
Similarly, in places like Chaco, people gift their efforts to community projects—some 
with labor and the sustenance of food, others with craftsmanship, and others with 
ceremonial skills. This is because there were clearly specializations of skills.
 Other models may seem equally able to address these points, however. Gift-giving 
is not the only sort of social engagement that can come to terms with exchanging 
incommensurable goods. Models of social organization that build from the notion 
of bargaining begin by imagining a world in which there is some competition for 
resources and perhaps other social goods, but where there are also potential gains 
to cooperation. In short, situations that call for bargaining involve some important 
scarcity and are such that working with others is potentially better for all, even if 
not everyone is made better off to the same degree or in the same way. The histori-
cal situation in and around Chaco Canyon would seem to fit this situation well. 
Furthermore, an actual embodiment of bargaining, namely trade, was an important 
dimension of social organization there.36
 Bargaining models share at least one problem in common with contract models. 
Namely, small group safety nets of exchange, and even networks of long-distance 
trade, do not require the comprehensive political organization found in Chaco 
Canyon. If a narrow notion of self-interest is assumed, as they are in bargaining 
models, it is unclear why people would voluntarily participate in wider forms of 
cooperation beyond what was required to meet prudential needs.
 Within gift-giving, the challenges of incommensurability in diverse societies are 
readily met. The incommensurability of gift-giving is compatible with some amount 
of scripted exchanges. In developed forms, social gift-giving is often integrated with 
activities such as courtship and business relationships, public events, and holidays, 
and quasi-private events such as marriages.37 But even when such contributions 
are compensated in some broad sense, it is understood that such compensation is 
a kind of acknowledgement and a symbol of thanks as much as it is an equivalent 
repayment in full. We do not need to imagine that this is all psychologically enjoyed 
or always appreciated. What we are looking for is a model of coalescence that can 
 35 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1999), bk. 7, 1163b15–20.
 36 Nelson, “Mesoamerican Objects and Symbols in Chaco Canyon Contexts,” pp. 360–61.
 37 For example, see Natalie Zemon Davis, “Gifts Gone Wrong,” in The Gift in Sixteenth-Century 
France (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), pp. 67–99.
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encompass the fact that in complex, pre-state societies such as Chaco not everyone 
was in a position to contribute in the same ways, and yet many must have found 
ways to add themselves to its collective projects. I am suggesting that we best un-
derstand the nature of their contributions if we interpret them in terms of cultural 
gifts to shared cultural projects, rather than as discharging contracts or bargains 
made under environmental or political threat.
 Here is a second consideration. A model of gift-giving also fits well with cir-
cumstances imbued with social meaning and for circumstances of ambiguous 
psychological intentions. The meaningful content of what is to be given and taken 
in any social exchange is often itself underspecified, especially when compared to 
the relative precision of written agreements or explicit promises. But, of course, 
for gifts to work as they do, the meaning of gifts cannot be endlessly vague. To 
answer this problem, custom and cultural meaning give shape to the content of 
gifts. Cultures set boundaries on meanings of various gifts. Contributions to shared 
projects and ceremonial practices count as welcomed social gifts in societies in 
whatever ways societies choose to count them, at least on their face. Of course, the 
social negotiations that go on under the surface of public gift-giving are deep and 
complex. Systems of gift-giving can be better or worse suited for their environ-
ments. They can be better or worse suited for how people treat one another. The 
point now is just that social practices about gift-giving are suited to accommodate 
incommensurability and ambiguous motivations without becoming a free-for-all.
Even within socially bounded meaning, the actual psychological intentions behind 
gifts can be deeply ambiguous. Gift-giving can be a means of genuine concern for 
others, or a sincere attempt to contribute to the common good according to ability. 
But they can also be a means of ingratiation, self-promotion, or even an assertion 
of power. Gifts can be used to humiliate their receivers. Gift-givers themselves 
may not even really understand their own motives or all of the social implications 
of the gifts they give. This will be especially true for children, or for newcomers, 
and especially true where gifts serve multiple purposes simultaneously. For such 
reasons, how we interpret the motivations behind a gift may evolve over time as 
more comes to be known about the concrete habits of particular gift-givers and 
particular gift-receivers. Again, cultures will set some bounds of what psychological 
intentions can be reasonably attributed to various gifts, the manner in which they 
are made, the customs of reciprocity that they create, and so on.
 So far we have seen that the forms of organization found in places such as Chaco 
Canyon can emerge in part because gift-giving can traffic in incommensurable 
goods, can live within culturally bounded meaning, and can tolerate ambiguous 
intentions. Perfectly mundane acts of cooperation and sharing can be understood 
as gifts—gifts that can be exchanged without mathematical remainder, but which 
carry a meaningful and lasting residue. Shared projects such as dam construction and 
maintenance can grow over generations into projects such as Great Houses through 
the iterated reciprocity of gifts cycled back and forth and systematically shared.
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 Here is a third important feature of cooperation through gifts. Any conditions of 
what counts as reasonable reciprocity in gift-giving relationships are often under 
negotiation and renegotiation. Givers can attempt to strengthen relationships by 
offering more of what they already provide—more corn, more labor. Or they can 
offer a new kind of gift—innovations in construction, exotic trade goods from afar, 
new forms of agricultural prediction, or new interpretations of cosmic meaning. 
But even movements toward increased generosity must ultimately wait on gift-
receivers to decide whether such gifts will be welcomed under the same description 
they are given. To even count as generosity, gifts must be received as generous, 
and not as, say, shaming or entrapment. Going the other direction, givers can of-
fer less, or restrict what was given before. Here, too, the change in behavior must 
wait on receivers to acquiesce. For example, to preserve gift-giving relationships, 
withdrawal or withholding must be understood as reasonable self-preservation, and 
not as spite or greed. Furthermore, notions of what count as generous gifts change 
as some come to have more than others, or come to have monopolies on certain 
necessary goods, and so on. Which gifts reasonably count as generous change 
depending upon, for instance, whether a society is suffering a natural disaster. The 
very same offer of labor or corn or spiritual guidance may be taken as beneficence 
in one circumstance, and miserliness in another. 
 This continual negotiation of what falls within the bounds of reasonableness also 
means that there are withdrawal points at nearly every turn, and chances for coop-
eration to end by one-sided dissolution. Though the breaking points in systems of 
gift-giving are everywhere, they cannot be known in advance or in the groundless 
abstract. They lie at the places where the reciprocities available fail to be compel-
ling, especially viewed within social patterns over time. But such breaking points 
are not as clearly instigated as someone breaking a promise by not doing something 
they said they would, or by doing something they promised they would not. Or, if 
it seems to come to this in dramatic moments, they are really a final expression of 
far deeper forms of distrust under the surface.
 Whereas contracts, bargains, and debts are underwritten by the threat of force 
and retaliation, gift-giving relationships are underwritten by the possibility of 
abandonment and withdrawal. Failed gift-giving arrangements are not dissolved 
by retaliation. They are not ended by attempts to forcibly take back what was 
already given. They are not ended by attempts to force others to deliver on failed 
promises. Rather, systems of gift-giving are dissolved by intentional neglect. Geo-
graphically, failed systems of gift-giving are ended by leaving. And this is one of 
the most striking features of Chaco. Most people seemed to have simply left and 
then chose not to repeat elsewhere the pattern that had occurred there. The overall 
pattern of coalescence and dispersal fits far better with a model of increasing and 
then decreasing relationships of gift-giving than a model of broken transactions. 
Other forms of purely transactional arrangements are more likely ended by violently 
aggressive or retributive means.
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 At a level of sufficient abstraction, all forms of human transactions may seem to 
be instances of debt generation or debt repayment. This may even seem to include 
what appears at first to be altruistic gift-giving or reciprocal gift-giving. To be sure, 
history is replete with examples of nominal gift-giving arrangements that were, 
or became, inescapable systems of one-upmanship or forced tribute. For example, 
Yunxiang Yan describes gift exchanges in China as sources of anxiety; Davis 
describes problems in sixteenth-century French systems of gift-giving, claiming 
that “Gifts call forth ingratitude the way markets call forth monopolies.”38 Marcel 
Mauss suggests something in gifts even stronger than anxiety and ingratitude. He 
suggests that, “charity wounds him who receives, and our whole moral effort is 
directed toward suppressing the unconscious harmful patronage of the rich almo-
ner.”39 And in a recent comprehensive work on the history of debt, David Graeber 
discusses what he calls the “final apotheosis of economics as common sense”—the 
idea that economies of all kinds are “really vast barter systems.”40
 Indeed, some practices in Chaco culture may have come close to this, but even 
then cultural symbolism seems dominant in the meaning of gifts. For example, 
Ben Nelson reports that copper bracelets from Mesoamerica found in Chaco Can-
yon were likely part of the kula system. In that system, status is associated with 
certain objects, not through their immediate ownership, but instead because they 
demonstrated connections with other high-status individuals.41
VI. GENERAL TRUST AND DECISION MAKING
 What is really being established in networks of concentrated gift-giving is a 
general trust that extends beyond the historic instances of particular gifts. Pro-
longed and successful gift-giving carries significance for future cooperation well 
beyond whether some particular agreement or transaction was wholly completed. 
The trust that matters is the trust that other people can be reasonably counted on 
to not always put themselves exclusively first. As Hegel defines trust in relation to 
the state, trust is “the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is 
preserved and contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case, the state), 
and in the latter’s relation to me as an individual.”42 General trust—whether in pre-
state societies or modern nation-states—is embodied by practices that assume that 
 38 Yunxiang Yan, The Flow of Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996); Davis, “Gifts Gone Wrong,” p. 67.
  39 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (New York: 
Norton Library, 1967), p. 63.
 40 David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, expanded ed. (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2014), pp. 
44-45.
 41 Nelson, “Mesoamerican Objects and Symbols in Chaco Canyon Contexts,” pp. 360–61.
 42 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the The Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), par. 268. For an extended discussion of this topic, see 
Stephen Houlgate, “Right and Trust in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Hegel Bulletin 37, no. 1 (2016): 
104–16.
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others are reasonable and will cooperate and aid others when this is most needed. 
In relationships of deserved trust, there is a purposeful simultaneity of personal 
and group interests.
 If we think about urban social relationships in terms of a general trust built up 
through gift-giving, at least in foundational, pre-state societies, and especially 
extended beyond the boundaries of kinship networks and cross time and collective 
projects, we can start to see why some social relationships intensify and others flag 
and fail. At the same time we can see why purely transactional models do not seem 
to fit well. Just as appropriate gifts build societies, inadequate gifts can be early 
harbingers of faltering relations of social trust. Given the nature of the buildup of 
Chaco settlements, and the ways in which people left them—returning to more 
horizontal social arrangements, and maintained themselves more thinly over wider 
geographical distances—it seems plausible that whatever benefits political elites 
were offering became less and less compelling. Archeologist Stephen Lekson sug-
gests the situation was even worse.
 43 Stephen H. Lekson, “Chaco Matters: An Introduction,” in The Archeology of Chaco Canyon: An 
Eleventh-Century Pueblo Regional Center (Sante Fe: School of American Research Press, 2006), p. 
29.
The remarkable shifts in Pueblo architecture, settlement, iconography, and society 
around 1300, when sites begin to look like modern pueblos, represent Pueblo peoples’ 
consciousness, deliberate reaction to and rejection of Chaco, distancing themselves 
from that bad experience. Pueblos developed new ways and means to avoid anything 
like Chaco, ever again.43
Any declared authority, or publically declared intentions of beneficence by cultural or 
political elites, even voiced from shared cultural monuments like the Great Houses, 
apparently became unpersuasive to those that had previously found some reasons 
for helpful participation in Chaco culture with all of the mutual dependencies that 
would have entailed. This comports with other contemporary observations made 
about Chaco Canyon. Rina Swentzell, an architect who grew up in the Santa Clara 
Pueblo, reflects:
[W]hen I first visited Chaco, the feeling of connection with the place was there—yet 
it was also puzzling, because it was different from being in Bandelier, Puye, or even 
Mesa Verde. The Chaco villages were grand, the rooms extra tall, and the walls massive 
and straight-edged. Even then, my response to the canyon was that some sensibility 
other than my Pueblo ancestors had worked on the Chaco great houses. There were the 
familiar elements such as the nansipu (the symbolic opening into the underworlds), 
kivas, plazas, and earth materials, but they were overlain by a strictness and precision 
of design and execution that was unfamiliar, not just to me but in other sites of the 
Southwest. It was clear that the purpose of these great villages was not to restate their 
oneness with the earth but to show the power and specialness of humans.
 For me, they represented a desire to control human and natural resources. They 
were not about the Pueblo belief in the capability of everyone, including children, 
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 Gift-giving relationships can become more intense or less intense over time, and 
can change in kind without any explicit renegotiation. As an intellectual exercise, it 
is perhaps possible to reinterpret every interaction of giving and taking as a contract 
or proto-contract, or as an instance of bargaining or proto-bargaining. It is possible 
to interpret relationships of decision making in early societies as game-theoretic 
versions of iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas or Stag Hunts. It is possible to treat them 
as proto-instances of quasi-mathematical debt creation.45 But given the ecological, 
cultural, and political situation of Chaco Canyon, it seems most straightforward to 
think of Chaco culture as an extended experiment of cultural participation through 
gift-giving. There is no persuasive evidence that even the most extensive construc-
tions, which certainly required hard labor, were compelled by threats of force, either 
directly or by threats of withholding food or water. There is no positive evidence 
to suggest that contributions were compelled through notions of leger-like debt. 
Sufficient numbers of people stayed within Chaco culture over many generations 
to produce astounding accomplishments even when migration elsewhere was a 
genuine possibility. What seems most plausible is that people contributed to the 
culture of Chaco Canyon as long as they found it comprehensively prudent and 
culturally meaningful to do so. For several hundred years this meant experimenting 
with novel, hierarchical social structures there that most likely began integrating 
various forms of authority. But when this faltered, most left and reconstituted their 
societies elsewhere on more egalitarian terms.
 We can still feel remnants of at least the possibility of maintaining urban relation-
ships through trust, rather than through transactional modes alone. As Jane Jacobs 
notes, modern cities are places where we constantly encounter strangers and depend 
 44 Rina Swentzell, “A Pueblo Woman’s Perspective on Chaco Canyon,” in In Search of Chaco: 
New Approaches to an Archeological Enigma, ed. David Grant Nobel (Santa Fe: School for Advanced 
Research Press, 2004), p. 50.
 45 See Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, esp. chap. 5, regarding three frameworks of the moral 
notion of debt, namely, (1) as the principle of “from each according to their abilities, to each according to 
their needs,”and  (2) as a principle of roughly equal exchange, and (3) as occurs in conditions of hierarchy.
to participate in daily activities, such that the process is more important than the end 
product. The Chaco great houses projected a different sensibility. The finished product 
was very important. Skill and specialization were needed to do the fine stonework and 
lay the sharp-edged walls. I concluded that the structures had been built by men in the 
prime of life with a vision of something beyond daily life and the present moment. 
These were men who embraced a social-political-religious hierarchy and envisioned 
control and power over place, resources, and people.
 The caches of clay jars found in Pueblo Bonito also made me suspicious of the pos-
sible exploitation of women by such a hierarchy of men in control, who determined 
what and how much was made. I wondered whether the society had shifted in focus so 
that the process of making pottery for daily use, which nurtures relationships with the 
earth and other people, had been transformed to create objects for economic production 
and religious or political power.44
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upon them.46 In only the loosest sense do we have a “contract” with those with 
whom we share our streets. We may build houses with families and friends, but cities 
are built with strangers. Roads and power grids and water works and educational 
systems are almost always in the hands of others. We do sometimes speak in the 
explicit language of legal contracts when these systems fail. Promises can be made 
and broken. Even vague notions like discrimination can be given operationalized 
definitions for the purposes of impersonal legal systems. In these ways, and surely 
others, the social logic of contracts has been laid over a more general trust. But 
often when cities fail us, it fundamentally feels like a betrayal of trust. It feels like 
abandonment.
 In contemporary cities, at least insofar as we are thinking about environmental 
decision making, there are two last points worth making. First, unlike those in 
Chaco Canyon, we find ourselves without the opportunity to walk away. Some of 
us may be able to escape, for a while, to places that will not be altered by climate 
change, natural devastation, or any number of forms of pollution. But most will 
not. Those who left Chaco Canyon had legitimate reason to believe that they could 
give up on, and walk away from, the ways of life being pursued by others. But since 
we do not have this possibility today, we do not really have any alternative except 
to find ways to support policies conducive to building a general trust. We cannot 
move away and start over. This will likely mean finding ways of requiring political 
decision makers to help us build environmental policies that are not shortsighted 
or that do not harm the many for immediate benefits for the few. Additionally, it 
will mean making sure that not only is justice done, but that it is seen as justice.
 Second, and relatedly, because so much of human decision making is carried 
out in cities, we must be especially diligent about developing a general trust there. 
Several decades ago, Wendell Berry laid down the rhetorical challenge of separat-
ing the city from the farmer’s field.47 The interconnections between urban life and 
rural life are certainly even more integrated now than they were then. Our collective 
environmental impact on the planet is set by the demands, agendas, and methods of 
cities. Even the farthest reaches of the planet are changed by technologies developed 
with levels of expertise made possible by the intensified social arrangements of 
cities. Unconnected, dispersed actions are not bringing the changes in our behaviors 
that the Earth requires. The records of nation-states are mixed. The record of the 
international community of nation-states has been inadequate so far. Our best hope 
for developing practices that are environmentally sound and that treat each other 
with respect is through thinking about practices and policies that are compatible 
with building, or rebuilding, a general trust within cities. 
 The outlines of such lessons can be found, I think, if we reflect on the interesting 
 46 Jane Jacobs, “The Uses of Sidewalks: Safety,” in The Death and Life of Great American Cities 
(New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 37–71.
 47 Wendell Berry, “The Agricultural Crisis as a Crisis of Culture,” in The Unsettling of America: 
Culture and Agriculture (New York: Avon Books, 1977), pp. 39–48.
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history of pre-state Chaco Canyon. There we can see that at least some foundational 
urban settlements come into being, in part, to address environmental challenges 
through broad cooperation. Of the possible mechanisms for doing so, purely trans-
actional arrangements seem to be peripheral and late to the game, and are only 
possible after some acceptable level of trust has already been established. I propose 
that the best way to explain that trust, especially in contexts of incommensurability 
and ambiguity, is through a model of iterated gift-giving. Our modern situation 
calls upon us to find modern ways of participating in environmental policies and 
practices that build this trust. When it failed in Chaco Canyon, the people could 
walk away and they did. We cannot.
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